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Abstract
We study an exchange economy with indivisible objects that may not be
substitutes for each other, and we introduce the p-substitutability condition,
a relaxation of the gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982),
in which a parameter vector p is adopted to permit complicated types of com-
plementarity. We prove that for any economy E, there exists a corresponding
vector pE such that the pE-substitutability condition is su¢ cient to guarantee
the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and that the largest competitive
price of each object is equal to its contribution to the social welfare. Our
analysis relies on a classication result which shows that the set of economies
can be partitioned into disjoint similarity classes such that an economy has
a competitive equilibrium whenever it is similar to another economy with an
equilibrium.
Keywords: Indivisibility, competitive equilibrium, gross substitutability, p-
substitutability.
1 Introduction
An essential issue for markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects and preferences
that are quasi-linear in money is under which conditions an e¢ cient allocation of
objects can be supported by a system of competitive prices as an equilibrium out-
come.1 A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a competitive equilibrium is the
Support by National Science Council of Republic of China under grant NSC 102-2410-H-156-001
is gratefully acknowledged.
yDepartment of Statistics and Actuarial Science, Aletheia University, New Taipei City 251, Tai-
wan. E-mail address: yyyang@mail.au.edu.tw
1For discussions on the existence of a competitive equilibrium for indivisible objects, see
Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997), Gul and Stacchetti (1999) and Sun and Yang (2006), among
others.
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gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982), which requires that ob-
jects are substitutes in the sense that the demand of each agent for an object does
not decrease when prices of some other objects increase. However, in many market
situations, heterogeneous objects may not be perfect substitutes for all agents. For
example, a scarf and a sweater may be substitutes for one agent, but are comple-
ments for another. To analyze such markets with di¤erent types of preferences, we
introduce the notion of p-substitutability, in which a parameter vector p is employed
to capture partial substitutability among objects.
The p-substitutability condition extends the gross substitutes condition in three
respects. First, any agents preferences satisfy the p-substitutability condition for
some proper vectors p. Hence, our framework is general enough to incorporate arbi-
trary patterns of complementarity. Second, the notion of p-substitutability is closely
linked to gross substitutability. Namely, agent is preferences are p-substitutable for
all parameter vectors p if and only if is preferences are gross substitutable. Finally,
we prove that p-substitutability is strictly weaker than p0-substitutability if p  p0.
This result suggests that for a given exchange economy, the degree of partial substi-
tutability among objects could be analyzed by the lower frontier of the set of vectors
p such that all agentspreferences are p-substitutable.
Based on these observations, together with a classication result which shows
that the set of economies can be partitioned into disjoint similarity classes such that
an economy has a competitive equilibrium if it is similar to another economy with
an equilibrium, we prove that for an arbitrary exchange economy E, there exists a
corresponding vector pE such that when all agentspreferences are pE-substitutable,
the following results hold:
(i) There exists a competitive equilibrium.
(ii) The largest competitive price of each object coincides with its contribution to
the social welfare.
(iii) The societys aggregate demand satises the gross substitutes condition.
Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999) shows that no weakening of the gross
substitutes condition is su¢ cient for an equilibrium to exist. As in the result (i), we
make a breakthrough and prove that the p-substitutability condition can guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium for economy E whenever p  pE. Another issue that
concerns us is the contribution of an object a to the social welfare, which is well known
as an upper bound for competitive prices of a. The result (ii) shows that this bound
itself is a competitive price of a under pE-substitutability, extending Theorem 5 of Gul
and Stacchetti (1999). In the nal part, we consider an representative agent whose
demand function coincides with the societys aggregate demand, and show that the
gross substitutability of individual agentspreferences is su¢ cient, but not necessary,
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for the gross substitutability of the representative agents preferences. Hence, objects
could be substitutes for the whole society even when complementarity exists among
objects for individual agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model and some
fundamental results on competitive equilibria in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce
the p-substitutability condition and give our main theorem. Section 4 contains the
proof of the main theorem. Section 5 concludes and relates our analysis to an existence
theorem by Sun and Yang (2006, Theorem 3.1), and the proof of a classication result
is presented in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider an exchange economy with a nite set N = f1; : : : ; ng of agents and
a nite set 
 = fa1; : : : ; amg of heterogeneous indivisible objects, and a perfectly
divisible good called money. Each agent i 2 N has a valuation function vi : 2
 ! R
with vi (;) = 0. The valuation vi gives rise to a quasi-linear utility function ui such
that the utility of agent i holding the set of objects A  
 and c units of money is
ui (A; c)  vi (A) + c:
For each coalition of agents C  N , the corresponding aggregate valuation function,
viC : 2

 ! R, is dened by
viC (A)  max
(X
i2C
vi (Ai) :
[
i2C
Ai = A and Ai \ Aj = ; for i 6= j
)
for A  
: (1)
An allocation is a partition of objects among all agents in N , i.e., a set X =
(X1; : : : ; Xn) of mutually exclusive bundles that exhaust 
, whereXi represents agent
i s consumption bundle under the allocation X. The possibility that Xi = ; for some
i is allowed. An allocation X = (X1; : : : ; Xn) is called e¢ cient if it maximizes the
sum of agentsvalues, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 vi (Xi) = viN (
).
A price vector p = (pa)a2
 2 Rj
j assigns a price to each object a 2 
. For any
set of objects A  
; let p (A) be a shorthand for Pa2A pa. A valuation function vi
is additively separable if there exists a price vector p such that vi (A) = p (A) for all
A  
.
Given two vectors p0; p00 2 Rj
j, we write p = p0 _ p00 if p is the vector in Rj
j
satisfying pa = max fp0a; p00ag for all a 2 
. Given a sequence of vectors p1; : : : ; pr in
Rj
j, we write p = _rk=1pk if p is the vector in Rj
j satisfying pa = max fp1a; : : : ; prag for
all a 2 
. For any valuation function vi, let pvi 2 Rj
j denote the minimal marginal
value vector of vi given by
pvia  min fvi (A [ fag)  vi (A) : A  
n fagg for a 2 
: (2)
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A competitive equilibrium is a pair hX; pi, whereX =(X1; : : : ; Xn) is an allocation
for E and p 2 Rj
j is a price vector such that for each agent i 2 N , the bundle Xi
maximizes is utility at price level p, i.e.,
Xi 2 Dvi (p)  fA  
 : vi (A)  p (A)  vi (B)  p (B) for all B  
g :
In this case, X is called an equilibrium allocation and p is called an equilibrium price
vector.
We assume that each agent i 2 N is initially endowed with a bundle of objects

i and a su¢ cient amount of money ci such that 
 = [i2N
i and ci  vi (A) for
all A  
. Under these assumptions, the initial endowments of objects and money
will be irrelevant to the competitive equilibria. Hence, we leave them unspecied and
simply represent this economy by E =
 

; (vi)i2N

.
We close this section with some fundamental observations on competitive equi-
librium. Lemma 1 (a) and (b), originally given by Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997)
and Gul and Stacchetti (1999), show that the standard theorems of welfare economics
hold for an economy with indivisible objects; and Lemma 1 (c) shows that the contri-
bution of an object a 2 
 to the social welfare is an upper bound for the equilibrium
prices of a. Finally, Lemma 2 shows that once a competitive equilibrium is reached,
the formation of coalitions among agents will not lead to a disequilibrium.
Lemma 1 Let hX; pi be a competitive equilibrium for the economy E =  
; (vi)i2N.
(a) The equilibrium allocation X is e¢ cient.
(b) For any e¢ cient allocation Y, hY; pi is also a competitive equilibrium for E.
(c) For each object a 2 
, pa  viN (
)  viN (
n fag).
Proof. Let Y =(Y1; : : : ; Yn) be an allocation.
(a) Since Xi 2 Dvi (p) for each i 2 N , we have
nX
i=1
vi (Xi) =
nX
i=1
[vi (Xi)  p (Xi)] + p (
)

nX
i=1
[vi (Yi)  p (Yi)] + p (
) =
nX
i=1
vi (Yi) :
(b) In case Y is e¢ cient, the above inequality implies vi (Xi)  p (Xi) = vi (Yi) 
p (Yi) for each i 2 N; and hence hY; pi is also a competitive equilibrium for E.
(c ) Let N0 = N [ f0g, X0 = ; and let E0 =
 

; (vi)i2N0

be the economy
constructed fromE by adding an agent 0 whose valuation function v0 satises v0 (A) =
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p (A) for A  
. Clearly, h(X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E0.
By (a), (X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) is an e¢ cient allocation for E0, and hence for each a 2 
,
viN (
) =
Pn
i=0 vi (Xi)  v0 (fag) + viN (
n fag) = pa + viN (
n fag).
Lemma 2 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy. Let C = f1; : : : ; rg  N and let
EC = (
; viC ; vr+1; : : : ; vn). If h(X1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E
and let XiC =
rS
j=1
Xj, then h(XiC ; Xr+1 : : : ; Xn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for
EC.
Proof. Suppose that h(XiC ; Xr+1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi is not a competitive equilibrium for
EC . Then there exists YiC  
 such that viC (YiC )   p (YiC ) > viC (XiC )   p (XiC ).
By denition there is a sequence of mutually disjoint bundles fY1; : : : ; Yrg such that
rS
j=1
Yj = YiC and
Pr
j=1 vj (Yj) = viC (YiC ). Together with the fact that Xj 2 Dvj (p)
for j = 1; : : : ; r, we obtain
viC (YiC )  p (YiC ) > viC (XiC )  p (XiC ) 
rX
j=1
[vj (Xj)  p (Xj)]

rX
j=1
[vj (Yj)  p (Yj)] = viC (YiC )  p (YiC ) ;
which is impossible.
3 The p-substitutability condition
A su¢ cient condition for the existence of a competitive equilibrium is the gross sub-
stitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982), the requirement that agents views
heterogeneous objects as substitutes for each other.
Denition 1 A valuation function vi satises the gross substitutes condition if for
any two price vectors p; q 2 Rj
j with p  q, and any bundle A 2 Dvi (p), there exists
B 2 Dvi (q) such that fa 2 A : qa = pag  B.
Note that additive separability implies gross substitutability, and a result of Rei-
jnierse et al. (2002, Theorem 8) shows that if a valuation function vi satises the gross
substitutes condition, then vi has decreasing marginal returns, i.e., for each a 2 
,
A  B  
n fag ) vi (B [ fag)  vi (B)  vi (A [ fag)  vi (A) :
However, di¤erent agents may have di¤erent types of preferences in many market
situations. Consider the three-agent economy with one scarf fa1g and two sweaters
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fa2; a3g given in Table I. The e¢ cient allocation X1 = f;g ; X2 = fa1g ; X3 = fa2; a3g
augmented with the price vector (8; 8; 8) is a competitive equilibrium, but only agent
1s valuation function satises the gross substitutes condition. The other two agents
view a scarf and a sweater as complements in the sense that both v2 and v3 satisfy
the gross substitutes and complements condition of Sun and Yang (2006).2
Table I
Agentsvaluations
; fa1g fa2g fa3g fa1; a2g fa1; a3g fa2; a3g fa1; a2; a3g
v1 0 7 7 7 13 13 12 19
v2 0 16 3 3 22 22 5 24
v3 0 5 11 11 17 17 20 23
To analyze such an economy with di¤erent types of preferences, we introduce
the notion of p-substitutability, a relaxation of the gross substitutes condition, in
which a parameter vector p 2 Rj
j is employed for measuring the degree of partial
substitutability among objects.
Denition 2 A valuation function vi satises the p-substitutability condition for
some vector p 2 Rj
j if the function vi [p] given by
vi [p] (A)  max fvi (B) + p (AnB) : B  Ag for A  
: (3)
satises the gross substitutes condition.
Note that the function vi [p] coincides with the aggregate valuation function viC of
the coalition C = fi; jg, where j is a virtual agent who has an additively separable val-
uation function vj satisfying vj (A) = p (A) for A  
. Hence, the p-substitutability
condition requires that objects are substitutes for the representative agent iC .
Lemma 3 Consider a sequence of valuation function v1; : : : ; vr and let C = f1; : : : ; rg.
If vi satises the gross substitutes condition for i = 1; : : : ; r, then the aggregate valu-
ation function viC also satises the gross substitutes condition.
Proof. Suppose that viC fails the gross substitutes condition. Theorem 2 of Gul and
Stacchetti (1999) implies that there exists an economy E = (
; viC ; vr+1; : : : ; vn) such
that vi satises the gross substitutes condition for i = r+1; : : : ; n; but E has no com-
petitive equilibrium. However, Theorem 2 of Kelso and Crawford (1982) implies that
there exists a competitive equilibrium for the economyE 0 = (
; v1; : : : ; vr; vr+1 : : : ; vn),
contradicting to the result of Lemma 2.
2See the end of this section for the denition of the gross substitutes and complements condition.
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Lemma 3 improves on Theorem 6 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999), which shows
that under the same conditions, the aggregate valuation function viC has decreasing
marginal returns. Moreover, since additive separability is stronger than gross substi-
tutability, Lemma 3 implies that the p-substitutability condition is weaker than the
gross substitutes condition.
In the following results, we note that for an arbitrary valuation function vi : 2
 !
R, the set of vectors
  (vi) 

p 2 Rj
j : vi is p-substitutable
	
could provide a good deal of information about vi and the markets involves vi. Lemma
4 (a) shows that objects are substitutes for agent i if and only if   (vi) = Rj
j. Lemma
4 (b) and (c) give some insights into the structure of   (vi), and suggests that for the
economy E =
 

; (vi)i2N

, the degree of partial substitutability among objects could
be analyzed by the lower frontier of the set of vectors \i2N  (vi). Moreover, Theorem
1 shows that for any economy E, there exists a corresponding vector pE 2 Rj
j such
that a number of equilibrium results hold whenever pE 2 \i2N  (vi). The proof of
Theorem 1 is given in the next section.
Lemma 4 Let vi : 2
 ! R be an arbitrary valuation function.
(a) vi satises the gross substitutes condition if and only if   (vi) = Rj
j.
(b)   (vi) is never empty.
(c) If p 2   (vi) and p  q 2 Rj
j, then q 2   (vi).
Proof. (a) The only ifpart of the proof follows from the fact that p-substitutability
is weaker than gross substitutability. The ifpart relies on the observation that vi
coincides with vi [pvi ], where the minimal marginal value vector pvi is dened by (2).
(b) Let p 2 Rj
j be a vector satisfying p (A)  vi (A) for all A  
. Then
vi [p] (A) = p (A) for all A  
. This implies that vi [p] is additively separable, and
hence p 2   (vi).
(c) Assume that vi satises the p-substitutability condition and p  q 2 Rj
j.
By denition vi [p] satises the gross substitutes condition. Then the result of (a)
implies that (vi [p]) [q] also satises the gross substitutes condition. Thus, it su¢ ces
to show that vi [q] coincides with (vi [p]) [q]. Let A be a set of objects. By denition,
there exist two subsets B and B0 of A such that vi [q] (A) = vi (B) + q (AnB) and
(vi [p]) [q] (A) = vi [p] (B
0) + q (AnB0). Similarly, there exists C 0  B0 such that
vi [p] (B
0) = vi (C 0) + p (B0nC 0). Then we have
vi [q] (A) = vi (B) + q (AnB)  vi [p] (B) + q (AnB)  (vi [p]) [q] (A)
= vi [p] (B
0) + q (AnB0) = vi (C 0) + p (B0nC 0) + q (AnB0)
 vi (C 0) + q (AnC 0)  vi [q] (A) ;
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and hence vi [q] (A) = (vi [p]) [q] (A).
Theorem 1 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy and let pE  _ni=1pvi 2 Rj
j. If
each agent is valuation function vi satises the pE-substitutability condition, then the
following results hold:
(a) There exists a competitive equilibrium.
(b) The social value vector p = (pa) 2 Rj
j dened by pa = viN (
)   viN (
n fag)
for a 2 
 is an equilibrium price vector for E.
(c) The social valuation function viN satises the gross substitutes condition, and
hence has decreasing marginal returns.
Theorem 1 (a) and (b) contribute to the analysis of competitive equilibrium for
economies with indivisible objects in three respects. First, Theorem 2 of Gul and
Stacchetti (1999) implies that the p-substitutability condition as strict weakening
of the gross substitutes condition cannot guarantee the existence of an equilibrium
for generic economies. However, we make a breakthrough and prove that the p-
substitutability condition is su¢ cient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium
for economy E whenever p  pE.
Second, we prove that the contribution of object a to the social welfare, vN (
) 
vN (
n fag), is not only an upper bound for the competitive prices of a, but itself is
also a competitive price under pE-substitutability. This result generalizes Theorem 5
of Gul and Stacchetti (1999). Recall the economy given in Table I. It is not di¢ cult
to verify pE = (16; 6; 6) and that vi is pE-substitutable for i = 1; 2; 3. Hence, the
e¢ cient allocation X1 = f;g ; X2 = fa1g ; X3 = fa2; a3g can be supported by the
social value vector p = (16; 9; 9) as a competitive equilibrium.
Third, in case the market E =
 

; (vi)i2N

under consideration has no competitive
equilibrium. To generate an equilibrium, the government could promise to purchase
any set of objects at price level ~p 2 Rj
j+ satisfying ~p_ pE 2 \i2N  (vi). For example,
the economy given in Table II has no equilibrium, and both agentsvaluation functions
violates the pE-substitutability condition. Since pE = (1:5; 2; 0) and (1:5; 2; 1:5) 2
  (v1) \   (v2), the government can create a new economy E 0 by adding itself as the
third agent who has a valuation function v3 such that v3 (A) = ~p (A) for ~p = (0; 0; 1:5)
and A  
, and then yields an equilibrium for E 0.
Table II
Agentsvaluations
; fa1g fa2g fa3g fa1; a2g fa1; a3g fa2; a3g fa1; a2; a3g
v1 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 6
v2 0 5 5 1 7 5 5.5 7
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The nal part of Theorem 1 extends Lemma 3 and shows that the gross substi-
tutability of individual agentsvaluation functions is su¢ cient but not necessary for
the gross substitutability of the social valuation function. This implies that objects
could be substitutes for each other from the viewpoint of the whole society even when
complementarity exists among objects for individual agents.
Consider the following economy with one table (t) and two chairs (c1; c2) from
Sun and Yang (2006). As shown in Table III, chair c1 complements table t and is a
perfect substitute for another chair c2, and each agents valuation function satises the
gross substitutes and complements (GSC) condition for S1 = ftg and S2 = fc1; c2g,
i.e., for any price vector p 2 Rj
j; a 2 Sk;   0, and A 2 Dvi (p), there exists
B 2 Dvi (p+ ea) such that [A \ Sk] n fag  B  [A [ Sk], where ea 2 Rj
j denotes
the characteristic vector whose i-th coordinate is 1 if ai = a and 0 otherwise. Hence,
there exists a competitive equilibrium by Theorem 3.1 of Sun and Yang (2006), which
shows that the GSC condition is su¢ cient for the existence of an equilibrium.
Table III
Agentsvaluations
; ftg fc1g fc2g ft; c1g ft; c2g fc1; c2g ft; c1; c2g
v1 0 18 3 3 22 22 4 24
v2 0 1 11 11 13 13 20 23
v3 0 12 6 6 20 20 10 25
Theorem 1 gives an alternative way to analyze the economy. For this economy,
pE = (16; 6; 6) and vi satises pE-substitutability for i = 1; 2; 3. This implies that
the e¢ cient allocation X1 = ftg ; X2 = fc2; c3g ; X3 = ; can be supported by the
social value vector p = (18; 9; 9) ; and that the social valuation function viN is gross
substitutable.
Finally, we conclude this section with a comparative static result that partially
generalizes Theorem 7 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999).
Theorem 2 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy such that for each i 2 N , vi satises
the pE-substitutability condition. For each bundle A  
, let EA =

A;
 
vAi

i2N

be
the economy dened by vAi (C) = vi (C) for C  A; and let pA =
 
pAa
 2 RjAj be the
vector dened by pAa = viN (A) viN (An fag) for a 2 A. Let N 0 = N[fn+ 1g and let
E 0 =
 

; (vi)i2N 0

be the economy obtained from E by adding an agent, n+ 1, whose
valuation function vn+1 satises the pE-substitutability condition. Let p0 = (p0a) 2 Rj
j
be the vector dened by p0a = viN0 (
)  viN0 (
n fag) for a 2 
. The following results
hold:
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(a) For each bundle A  
, pA is an equilibrium price vector for EA; and pBa  pAa
whenever a 2 B  A  
.
(b) p0 is an equilibrium price vector for E 0, and p0  p.
Proof. (a) Let A  
 and let pE;A =  pE;Aa  2 RjAj be the vector dened by
pE;Aa = p
E
a for a 2 A. It is not di¢ cult to verify that vAi is pE;A-substitutable for each
i 2 N and pEA = _ni=1pvAi  pE;A, where vector pvAi =

p
vAi
a

2 RjAj is dened by
p
vAi
a = min

vAi (C [ fag)  vAi (C) : C  An fag
	
for a 2 A:
By Lemma 4 (c) and Theorem 1 (b), we obtain that vAi is p
EA-substitutable for i 2 N ,
and hence pA is an equilibrium price vector for EA. Let B be a subset of A and let
a 2 B. Since the result of Theorem 1 (c) shows that viN has decreasing marginal
returns, it follows that
pBa = viN (B)  viN (Bn fag)  viN (A)  viN (An fag) = pAa :
(b) Since pE
0
= pE _ pvn+1  pE, Lemma 4 (c) implies that vi is pE0-substitutable
for each agent i 2 N 0. By Theorem 1 (b), p0 is an equilibrium price vector for E 0.
Let a 2 
 and let (X1; : : : ; Xn+1) be a partition of 
n fag such that
Pn+1
i=1 vi (Xi) =
viN0 (
n fag). Since viN has decreasing marginal returns, we have
pa = viN (
)  viN (
n fag)  viN (
nXn+1)  viN ((
n fag) nXn+1)
 viN (
nXn+1) 
nX
i=1
vi (Xi) = viN (
nXn+1) + vn+1 (Xn+1)  viN0 (
n fag)
 viN0 (
)  viN0 (
n fag) = p0a:
4 Proof of Theorem 1
We rst introduce a similarity relation among economies. Then we prove Theorem
1 with the aid of a classication result, Lemma 5, which implies that whenever a
similarity class contains an economy with a competitive equilibrium, each economy
in this class also has an equilibrium. The proof of Lemma 5 is represented in the
Appendix.
Denition 3 Two economies E 0 and E 00 are directly similar, denoted by E 0  E 00,
if there exist an economy E = (
; v1; : : : ; vn) and a vector q 2 Rj
j such that E 0 =
10
(
; v1; : : : ; vj [q] ; : : : ; vn) for some j 2 N and E 00 = (
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn) ; where v0 is
the the valuation function such that v0 (A) = q (A) for A  
. Moreover, we say
that two economies E 0 and E 00 are similar if there exists a sequence of economies,
E0; E1; : : : ; Er, such that E 0 = E0; E 00 = Er; and Ek 1  Ek for k = 1; : : : ; r.
Lemma 5 Let q 2 Rj
j. Let E 0 = (
; v1 [q] ; v2; : : : ; vn) and E 00 = (
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn)
be directly similar economies such that v0 is the valuation function satisfying v0 (A) =
q (A) for A  
. Then E 0 has a competitive equilibrium if and only if E 00 has a
competitive equilibrium.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. Assume that vi

pE

satises the gross
substitutes condition for all i 2 N .
(a) By the combination of Lemma 5 and Theorem 2 of Kelso and Crawford (1982),
it su¢ ces to show that E =
 

; (vi)i2N

is similar to the economy


;
 
vi

pE

i2N

.
Note that vi [pvi ] = vi for each i 2 N . Hence, we may writeE = (
; v1 [pv1 ] ; : : : ; vn [pvn ]).
For each i 2 N , let v0i be the valuation function dened by v0i (A) = pvi (A) for
A  
. It is not di¢ cult to see thatE is directly similar toE1 = (
; v01; : : : ; v0n; v1; : : : ; vn).
Let E2 = (
; v02 [pv1 ] ; v03; : : : ; v0n; v1; : : : ; vn) and let
Ej 
 

; v0j
_j 1k=1pvk ; v0(j+1); : : : ; v0n; v1; : : : ; vn for j = 3; : : : ; n:
Since v0j
_j 1k=1pvk (A) =  _jk=1pvk (A) for A  
 and for j = 2; : : : ; n, it follows
that E is similar to En =
 

; v0n
_n 1k=1pvk ; v1; : : : ; vn. Let v0 = v0n _n 1k=1pvk.
Then v0 (A) = (_nk=1pvk) (A) = pE (A) for A  
; and hence we may write En =
(
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn). Finally, since v0 = v0

pE

and vi

pE

=
 
vi

pE
 
pE

for i =
1; : : : ; n, it follows that
En 
 

; v1

pE

; v2; : : : ; vn
   
; v1 pE ; v2 pE ; v3; : : : ; vn      
;  vi pEi2N :
(c) Suppose, to the contrary, that the social valuation function viN violates the
gross substitutes condition. By Theorem 2 of Gul and Stacchetti (1999), there exists
an economy E 0 = (
; viN ; vn+1; : : : ; vn0) such that vi satises the gross substitutes
condition for i = n + 1; : : : ; n0 but E 0 has no competitive equilibrium. We now
consider the economy E 00 = (
; v1; : : : ; vn; vn+1 : : : ; vn0). Note that pE
00
= _n0i=1pvi = _n0i=n+1pvi _ pE  pE. By Lemma 4 (a) and (c), we see that in the economy E 00,
each agents valuation function satises the pE
00
-substitutability condition. Then the
combination of the result of (a) and Lemma 2 implies that E 00 has a competitive
equilibrium, and so does E 0. This is impossible.
(b) Let Y = (Y1; : : : ; Yn) be an e¢ cient allocation for E. We are going to
show that hY; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E. Consider the economy E0 =
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(
; v0; v1; : : : ; vn) constructed from E by adding an agent 0 with the valuation func-
tion v0 given by v0 (A) = p (A) for A  
 and let N0 = f0; 1; : : : ; ng. Since
pE0  pE, Lemma 4 (c) implies that in economy E0, each agents valuation func-
tion satises the pE0-substitutability condition. By (a), there exists an equilib-
rium h(X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) ; pi for E0. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
X0 = fa1; : : : ; arg  
 and let A0 = ;, Aj = fa1; : : : ; ajg for j = 1; : : : ; r. Note that
(X0; X1; : : : ; Xn) is an e¢ cient allocation for E0 and the result of (c) implies that the
social valuation function viN has decreasing marginal returns. It follows that
0 
rX
j=1
[viN (
)  viN (
n fajg)] 
rX
j=1
[viN (
nAj 1)  viN (
nAj)] (4)
= v0 (X0) + viN (
nX0)  viN (
)  v0 (X0) +
nX
j=1
vj (Xj)  viN (
)
= viN0 (
)  viN (
) :
Together with the fact that viN (
) =
Pn
i=1 vi (Yi) = v0 (;) +
Pn
i=1 vi (Yi)  viN0 (
),
we have viN (
) = v0 (;) +
Pn
i=1 vi (Yi) = viN0 (
). Let Y0 = ;. By Lemma 1
(b), h(Y0; Y1; : : : ; Yn) ; pi is also a competitive equilibrium for E0. This implies that
h(Y1; : : : ; Yn) ; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E and for all a 2 
;
0  v0 (fag)  pa = pa   pa:
Together with the result of Lemma 1 (c), we obtain that p = p is an equilibrium price
vector for E.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on markets with indivisible objects. We
introduce the notion of p-substitutability to extend the scope of gross substitutability
and to analyze economies with complex types of preferences. Then we prove that for
any economy E, a number of equilibrium results hold under pE-substitutability. In
this concluding section, we briey discuss some implications of our results and further
research directions.
We rst note that the classication result, Lemma 5, can also be further applied
to generalize some other equilibrium results. For example, with a proof similar to
that of Theorem 1, it is not di¢ cult to obtain the following theorem. The proof is
omitted for brevity.
Theorem 3 Let E =
 

; (vi)i2N

be an economy. If for each agent i 2 N , there
exists pi 2 Rj
j such that pi  pE and vi [pi] satises the GSC condition, then
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(a) there exists a competitive equilibrium; and
(b) the social value vector p = (pa) 2 Rj
j is an equilibrium price vector whenever
the social valuation function viN has decreasing marginal returns.
Moreover, various models of matching market, including the job matching mar-
ket of Kelso and Crawford (1982), the matching with contracts model of Hateld
and Milgrom (2005), and the trading network model of Hateld et al. (2013), sig-
nicantly extend the exchange economy model discussed in the present paper. In
order for an equilibrium or a stable outcome to exist, gross substitutability has been
adapted to these much richer environments. The issue of suitably generalizing our
p-substitutability to these matching market models might bring considerable contri-
butions and is left for future works.
Appendix. Proof of Lemma 5
()) Assume that hX; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E 0 and let p0 = p _ q.
We rst prove that hX; p0i is also a competitive equilibrium for E 0. It is not
di¢ cult to prove that A^ = fa 2 
 : pa < qag is a subset of X1. By denition there
exists Y1  X1 such that v1 [q] (X1) = v1 (Y1) + q (X1nY1) and v1 [q] (Y1) = v1 (Y1). In
case there exists a^ 2 A^nX1, we have
v1 [q] (X1 [ fa^g)  p (X1 [ fa^g)  [v1 (Y1) + q ((X1 [ fa^g) nY1)]  p (X1 [ fa^g)
= v1 [q] (X1) + qa^   p (X1 [ fa^g) > v1 [q] (X1)  p (X1) ;
which contradicts to the fact X1 2 Dv1[q] (p). Note that A^  X1 implies p0a = pa for
all a 2 
nX1and hence Xi 2 Dvi (p0) for i = 2; : : : ; n. Moreover, since X1 2 Dv1[q] (p),
it follows that for each bundle A  
, we have
v1 [q] (X1)  p0 (X1) = v1 [q] (X1)  p (X1) + p

A^

  q

A^

 v1 [q]

A [ A^

  p

A [ A^

+ p

A^

  q

A^

= v1 [q]

A [ A^

  p0

A [ A^

 v1 [q] (A) + q

A^nA

  p0

A [ A^

= v1 [q] (A)  p0 (A) ;
i.e., X1 2 Dv1[q] (p0).
We are now ready to construct an equilibrium hY; p0i forE 00. LetY = (Y0; Y1; : : : ; Yn)
be the allocation given by Y0 = X1nY1 and Yi = Xi for i = 2; : : : ; n. Since p0  q and
X1 2 Dv1[q] (p0), it follows that
v1 [q] (Y1)  p0 (Y1) = v1 (Y1)  p0 (Y1) = v1 [q] (X1)  q (X1nY1)  p0 (Y1)
 v1 [q] (X1)  p0 (X1)  v1 [q] (Y1)  p0 (Y1) :
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This implies Y1 2 Dv1[q] (p0) and Y0 2 Dv0 (p0).
(() Assume that hX; pi is a competitive equilibrium for E 00 and let p0 = p _ q.
We are going to show that the pair hY; p0i such that Y1 = X0 [X1 and Yi = Xi for
i = 2; : : : ; n is a competitive equilibrium for E
0
.
We note that A^ = fa 2 
 : pa < qag is a subset of X0. In case there exists a^ 2
A^nX0, then v0 (X0 [ fa^g)  p (X0 [ fa^g) = v0 (X0) + (qa^   pa^)  p (X0) > v0 (X0) 
p (X0), which contradicts to the fact X0 2 Dv0 (p). This implies
p0a = pa for all a 2 
nX0 (5)
and hence Yi = Xi 2 Dvi (p0) for i = 2; : : : ; n. On the other hand, in case there
exists b^ 2 X0 such that pb^ > qb^, we have v0

X0n
n
b^
o
  p

X0n
n
b^
o
= v0 (X0) +
(pb^   qb^)   p (X0) > v0 (X0)   p (X0), which contradicts to the fact X0 2 Dv0 (p)
again. This implies that for all a 2 X0, pa  qa and hence p0a = qa. Let A  
 be an
arbitrary bundle. Then there exists A0  A such that v1 [q] (A) = v1 (A0) + q (AnA0).
Together with (5) and the facts X1 2 Dv1 (p) and p0 = p _ q, we have
v1 [q] (Y1)  p0 (Y1) = v1 [q] (X0 [X1)  p0 (X0 [X1)  v1 (X1) + q (X0)  p0 (X1)  p0 (X0)
= v1 (X1)  p (X1)  v1 (A0)  p (A0) = v1 [q] (A)  q (AnA0)  p (A0)
 v1 [q] (A)  p0 (A) .
This implies Y1 2 Dv1[q] (p0) and completes the proof.
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